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ANIMALS-INJURIES By DOGs-LIABILITY.-ALEXANDER V. CROSBY,
iig N. W. 717 (IoWA)-Held, that one harboring a dog, knowing him to
be vicious, is liable for the injuries committed by him as though he was
the owner in possession.
The great preponderance of authority holds that any person keeping
or harboring a mischievous or vicious animal, with knowledge of its
propensities, does it at his peril. Brent v. Kimbal, 6o Ill. 211; Woolf V.
Chalker, 31 Conn. 121. And permitting a dog to be on the premises con-
stitutes a harboring or keeping, Barrett v. Railroad, 3 Allen ioi (Mass.) ;
also the existence of a vicious nature in a dog is equivalent to an ex-
press notice of such nature. Earl v. Van Alstine, 8 Barb. 630 (N. Y.).
But the courts are not in accord on this point. Some hold that vicious
dogs are nuisances per se, while others hold the owner prima facie liable
for injuries caused by them. Brown v. Carpenter, 26 Vt. 638; Jones v. Carey,
9 Houst. 214 (Del.). Still others hold the gist of the action to be
negligence, Fake v. Addicks, 45 Minn. 37; thus, holding the owner liable
only when he fails to exercise a degree of care commensurate to the
danger which would follow if the animal escaped beyond his control.
De Gray v. Murray, 69 N. J. L. 458.
BROKERS-COMPENSATION-SUFFICIENCy OF SERVIcE OF BROKER.-BRowN
v. ADAMS, 69 At. 6oi (R. I.)Q Held, that where a broker for an agreed
commission was employed to sell certain real estate for a fixed price, but
did not procure a purchaser at that price and the owner sold at a less
price, the broker was not entitled to recover a commission, even though
it appears that the purchaser to whom the sale was made was procured
by him.
The general rule is that where the principal sells at a less sum than
that for which the broker was authorized to sell, the latter is entitled to
commissions on the amount realized. Smith v. Anderson, 2 Idaho 537.
And this has been held wltere the buyer is one with whom the broker had
been negotiating, but has not been introduced by him to his principal.
Williams v. Bishop, ii Colo. App. 378. It has been held, however, in
accord with the principal case, that the broker must find a purchaser at
the price for which he has been authorized to sell when a specific price
has been fixed, before he can lawfully demand his compensation. Satter-
thwarte v. Vreeland, 3 Iun. (N. Y.) 152. And there is authority for
the holding that when the price or limit is fixed it is equivalent to con-
tracting to pay the plaintiff the commission agreed, when he affected a
sale at that price. Jacobs v. Kolff, 2 Hilton i33 (N. Y.) ; Williams v. Mc-
Graw, 52 Mich. 48o. But the majority of cases do not construe the con-
tract for commission of sale for fixed price in this manner. Spotswood v.
Morris, io Idaho i29; Plant v. Thompson, 42 Kan. 664.
642 YALE LAW JOURNAL
CARRIERS-CARRIAGE OF GOODS-CARRIER AS WAREHOUSEMAN.-NORFOLK
& W. Ry. Co. v. STUARTS DRAFT MILLING Co., 63 S. E. 415 (VA.).-Held,
that a railroad's liability as a common carrier ceases, and its liability as a
warehouseman begins when goods are not taken by the consignee within
a reasonable time after their arrival.
There are three lines of cases on this point. The Massachusetts rule,
followed by several states, holds that the liability as common carrier
ceases as soon as the goods are unloaded from the cars, even though
there be no notice of fheir arrival to the consignee. Norway Plains Co.
v. Boston & M. R. Co., I Gray (Mass.) 263; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v.
Frankenberg, 54 Ill. 88; Chicago I. & I. Ry. Co. v. Reyman, 166 Ind. 278.
The English courts and the courts of a majority of the states hold that
such liability continues until the consignee has had a reasonable time in
which to remove the goods. Moses v. Boston & Af. R. Co., 32 N. H. 523;
Graves v. Hartford & N. Y. Steamboat Co., 38 Conn. 143; Chapman v.
Great Western R. Co., 5 Q. B. Div. 278. A number of states, also, fol-
low the Michigan rule, which holds that the common carrier liability con-
tinues for a reasonable time after notice of the arrival has been given.
Mich. Cent. R. Co. v. Ward, 2 Mich. 538; Zinn v. N. I. Steamboat Co.,
49 N. Y. 442. A reasonable time is defined, not as varying with the dis-
tance or convenience of the consignee, but as such a time as -would en-
able a person, living in the vicinity of the place of delivery, in the usual
course of business, to inspect and take away the goods. Leavenworth,
L. & G. R. Co. v. Mars, 16 Kan. 333.
CARRIERS-INJURIES TO PASSENGERS-SETTING DoWN PASSENGERS.-
WARD V. CHICAGO CITY Ry. Co., 86 N. E. iiii (Ill.).-Held, that where
street car company was negligent in operating its cars while setting down a
passenger, it was liable for injuries to such passenger, though the presence
of snow and ice in the street for which the city was responsible was a
concurring cause of the accident.
While a street car company is not responsible for the condition of
the street on which it operates its cars, yet it is bound to exercise rea-
sonable care for the discharge of passengers at a safe and proper place for
that service. Steward v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 78 Minn. 85. And is
obliged to hold its cars stationary until all passengers are known to be
safely off. Washington and G. R. Co. v. Harman's Adm'r, 147 U. S. 511;
Neslie v. Second and Third St. Pass. Ry. Co., 133 Pa. St. 300. The
transportation company will be held liable for injuries caused by sudden
or premature starts whether the act of the conductor or motorman. Mun-
roe v. Third Ave. R. Co., 5o N. Y. Super. Ct. (18 Jones & S.) 114;
Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Munford, 97 Ill. 56o. But where the car has
stopped a reasonable length of time and as it again starts a passenger
attempts to alight without the knowledge of the conductor or where the
signal was given by a passenger, this rule will not apply. Gilbert v. West
End St. Ry. Co., i6o Mass. 403; Wayne v. N. Y. City Ry., 1O7 N. Y. S. 8o7.
CARRIERS-ISSUANCE OF BILLS OF LADING WITHOUT RECEIPT OF GOODS-
LIABILITY OF THE CARRIER.-MISSOURI, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. SEALY, 99 PAC.
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230 (KAN.).-Held, that a common carrier is liable on a bill of lading
issued by its agent although no goods were received by the carrier.
The English courts unanimously hold that a bill of lading issued by
the agent of a common carrier without receipt of the goods does not
bind the carrier, even in favor of a bona fide purchaser for value. Grant
v. Norway, io C. B., 665; Lickbarrow v. Mason, 2 T. R. 63. And in
order to bind the principal in such cases you must prove not only con-
cealment by the agent, but also direct personal knowledge and con-
cealment by the principal. Wilde v. Gibson, i H. of L. Cases 6o5. In the
American courts there is an irreconcilable conflict. Some courts hold
that the carrier clothes its agent with power to issue a bill of lading
upon the existence of some extrinsic facts necessarily and peculiarly
within the agent's knowledge, Armour v. M. C. Ry. Co., 65 N. Y. II; that
this power will be implied from the accustomed performance by the agent
of acts of the same general character, Adams Express Co. v. Schlessinger,
75 Pa. St. 246; and that the carrier is, therefore, estopped from denying
what his accredited agent assertt in a bill of lading. Bank of Batavia v.
R. R. Co., io6 N. Y. i95. A few courts permit the carrier to show non-
receipt of goods as against a' bona fide transferee for value. Black v.
Wil. etc. Ry Co., 92 N. C. 42. But the weight of American authority sup-
ports the English rule, holding the carrier not liable when no goods are
received. Nat. Bank of Coin. v. Ry. Co., 44 Minn. 224. For, as Iron
Mountain Ry. Co. v. Knight, 122 U. S. 79, holds, the receipt of the goods
lies at the foundation of the contract to carry and deliver.
CARRIERS-MEASURE OF DAIMAGES-Loss OF ARTICLES OF No MkARKET
VALUE WHICH CANNOT BE REPLACED.-MISSOURI, K. & T. Ry. Co OF
TEXAS v DEMENT, 115 S. W. 635 (TEx.).-Held, that the measure of
damages for the loss of a box containing enlarged pictures of plaintiff's
dead wife and of the father, mother and sister of plaintiff's wife, which
could not be reproduced and plaintiff's family Bible containing the family
record of births, marriages, deaths, etc., is the actual loss in money sus-
tained by the owner because of his being deprived of them and not any
fanciful price that he might for sentimental reasons place upon them.
The measure of damages for loss of goods is, in general, the market
value of the goods at the destination or the cost of obtaining other goods
of the same kind. Goddard on Carriers, Sec. 417. But where the goods
have no market value and cannot be replaced by goods of similar kind,
the courts have been placed under considerable embarrassment in framing
a proper rule of law which would be definite and satisfactory. Watt v.
Nevada C. R. R. Co. (and note), 62 Am. St. R. 772. The courts have
agreed that there can he no recovery of any pretimn affectionis. Green %,.
B. & L. R. R. Co., 128 Mass. 22. The effort is to award damages equal
to the actual value of the goods to the owner. Adams Express Co. v.
Hoeing, 9 Ky. Law R. 814. Of this value, only a jury can judge, and its
value may be shown to them by all pertinent facts and circumstances as
enable them to establish the real and ordinary value of the goods at the
time of their destruction. Suth. on Damages, Vol. II, Sec. 654; Jackson-
ville,. etc., Ry. Co. v. Peninsular Land, etc., Co., 27 Fla. i.
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CARRIERS-REFRIGERATOR CARS-REFUSAL TO FURNISH-TENDER OF
FREIGHT.-ATLANTA COAST LINE R. Co. v. GERATY, I66 FED. Io.-Held, that
where the plaintiff, owning a farm in a truck region, was induced to plant
a large quantity of cabbages by the assurance of the defendant railroad
company that refrigerator cars would be furnished to transport the cab-
bage to market, which it refused to do on reasonable demand, the plaintiff
was entitled to recover for unharvested cabbages which spoiled because
of the defendant's refusal to furnish refrigerator cars, the plaintiff after
such refusal not being bound thereafter to tender the cabbage for ship-
ment. Waddill, D. J., dissenting.
A common carrier is bound to furnish suitable care as required by
the shipper upon reasonable notice and tender of the goods, whenever it
can do so without jeopardizing its other business and it is liable for re-
fusing to transport such freight. Chicago, St. L. & P. Ry. Co. v. Wolcott,
141 Ind. 267; Strough v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 181 N. Y. 533;
Newport News & M. V. R. R. Co. v. Mercer, 96 Ky. 475; Ayres v.
Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 71 Wis. 372. But the few cases on
the question whether a shipper can recover damages without proof of
tender of freight are in conflict. In Houston, E. & W. f. Ry. Co. v.
Campbell, 91 Tex. 551, it is held that, after a carrier has refused to
furnish transportation, the shipper is not bound to prepare and offer his
freight in order to become entitled to damages for the refusal. Contra:
Little Rock & Ft. Scott Ry. Co. v. Conatser, 61 Ark. 56o, holds that dam-
ages cannot be recovered without proof that the freight had been ten-
dered.
CONTRACTs-LEGALITY-RESTRAINT OF TRADE.-FLOWERS & PEAGLER V.
W. T. SMITH LUMBER Co., 47 So. io22 (ALA.).--Held, that a contract be-
tween two lumber companies by which each company is to be confined in
its operations to one side of a line drawn through two counties for a dis-
tance of over twenty miles, is invalid, as in restraint of competition; and
is not validated by conveyances of land separating their ownership in ac-
cordance with the contract.
The early rule of the common law was that contracts in general re-
straint of trade are void without regard to circumstances. Diamond Match
Co. v. Roeber, io6 N. Y. 473. Contracts in partial restraint of trade as to
particular persons or places or for a limited time are valid if founded upon
a good consideration and reasonable in their operation. McCurry v. Gib-
son, io8 Ala. 451; Hedge, Elliott & Co. v. Lowe, 47 Iowa 137. The courts
have stated the true test to be whether the restraint is such only as to
afford a fair protection to the interests of the party in favor of whom
it is given and not so large as to interfere with the interests of the
public. Horner v. Graves, 7 Bing. 735 (Eng.). But the courts are looking
more and more to the nature of the entire transaction and to the character
and reasonableness of the protection afforded the contractee than to the
time or geographical limitations which may be fixed. Eddy, Law of Com-
binations, Vol. II, p. 818.
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CONTRACTS-LEGALITY-VIOLATION OF STATUTE.-SuNLOWER I"UMBER
Co. v. TURNER SUPPLY Co., 48 So. 51o (ALA.).-Held, that when statutory
conditions for the conduct of business are not complied with, agreements
made in the course of the business are void if the conditions are made for
the benefit of the public, but valid if the conditions are for revenue pur-
poses, even though a specific penalty is imposed.
In determining whether contracts made in the course of a business in
which statutory conditions have not been fulfilled are valid, the intent
of the Legislature is to be found in the language of the statute or in the
purpose sought to be accomplished. Miller v. Ammon, 145 U. S. 421.
Many cases hold that, if the language of the statute simply imposes a
penalty without a direct prohibition to enter upon the contract, the
mere penalty does not invalidate the contract. Johnson v. Hudson, ii East
18o; Rahter v. Nat. Bank of Lancaster, 92 Pa. St. 393. But many other
courts hold that the imposition of a penalty implies a prohibition. Miller
v. Post, 83 Mass. 434; Aiken v. Blaisdell, 41 Vt. 655. The purpose of
the statute, therefore, is the better criterion. It is generally held that, if
the object of the statute is to facilitate the collection of revenue, con-
tracts made in variance with it are nevertheless valid; but, if the purpose
is to protect public health or morals or to prevent fraud, such contracts
are void. Lindsey v. Rutherford, 56 Ky. 245; Mandebaum v. Gregovitch,
17 Nev. 87.
CRIMINAL LAW-HEARSAY EVIDENCE-CONFESSION THROUGH INTER-
PRETER.-PEoPLE v. RANDAZZIo, 87 N. E. i12 (N. Y.).-Held, that the
transcript of stenographic notes of an alleged confession claimed to have
been made by the accused in the district attorney's office through an inter-
preter who swore that he had correctly interpreted was not inadmissible
as hearsay because the interpreter was not selected by the defendant, but
by the district attorney.
When an interpreter has been selected by one person to make a
communication to another, the interpreter is regarded as the agent of the
first, and accordingly the statements of the interpreter are admissible as
original evidence and are not hearsay. Camerlin v. Palmer Co., io Allen
(Mass.) 539; McCormick v. Fuller, 56 Iowa 43. Where the interpreter
has been employed by the party other than the one making the communi-
cation, both parties are presumed to have constituted the interpreter their
joint agent. Commonwealth v. Vose, 157 Mass. 393. In the case of
Commonwealth v. Storti, 17-7 Mass. 339, a confession was admitted in evi-
dence under conditions analogous to those in the present case on the
ground that it was the best evidence. It is to be noted, however, that it is
always necessary that the interpreter, unless he is dead, insane or out of
reach of process, be present at the trial and testify to the correctness of
the translation. State v. Noyes, 36 Conn. 8o; State v. Abbatto, 64 N. J. L.
658.
CRIMINAL LAw-NEW TRIAL-MISCONDUCT OF JURORS-USE OF LQUOR.
-BLTO N v. TERRITORY, 99 PAC. 163 (OKLA.).-Held, that the use of intoxi-
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cating liquor as a beverr..e a.y a juror during the trial and consideration of
a capital case will vitiate a verdict of guilty, and entitle the accused to a
new trial.
The general rule of law on this point seems to be that the use of
intoxicating liquors by the jury, or a juror, is not ground.for a new trial
in the absence of any showing that injurious consequences resulted there-
from. Jones v. People, 6 Colo. 452. The fact that some of the jurors
drank intoxicating liquor during the trial raises a presumption against the
validity of the verdict which may be rebutted by proof that the jurors
were not intoxicated. State v. Madigan, 57 Minn. 425. But many cases
hold that secret drinking of intoxicating liquor by the jury in the jury
room is such misconduct as throws the burden on the state of proving,
on a motion by the prisoner for a new trial, that he was not injured
thereby. State v. Greer, 22 W. Va. 8oo. And the modern tendency seems
to be that the courts will not inquire whether the juror was affected by
what he drank, for the only safeguard to purity and correctness of the
verdict is that no drinking shall be allowed. Davis v. State, 35 Ind. 496;
Pelham v. Page, 6 Ark. 535. And this is especially true in capital cases.
People v. Douglass, 4 Cow. 26 (S. C.). In Texas and Iowa no drinking
at all is allowed. Jones v. State, 13 Tex., 168; State v. Baldy, 17 Iowa 39.
DOWER-ESTATES AND INTERESTS SUBJECT-ASSIGNMENT.-BAKER V.
BAGG, Er AL, 114 N. Y. SuPP. 66o.-Held, that where a son, prior to his
father's death, had assigned all of the interest in the estate of the father
which he might acquire after his death, the wife of the son had no dower
in the real estate of the father which descended to the son, subject to the
right of the assignee.
To entitle a wife to dower, the husband must, during coverture, have
been seised, either in fact or in law of an estate of inheritance. Phelps z.
Phelps, 143 N. Y. 197. This seisin also must be a beneficial seisin.
Maybury v. Brien, I5 Pet. (U. S.) 21; Gully v. Ray, 57 Ky. lO7. And,
where the husband serves merely as a conduit, through which title passes
to a third party, it is held that he is not beneficially seised. I ashburn,.
Real Prop., 188, 6th ed.; Fontaine v. Boatmen's Say. Inst., 57 Mo. 552.
ExECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS-COMPENSATION-SERVICES AS ATTOR-
NEY.-ORDNARY V. CONNOLLY, ET AL., 72 ATL. 363 (N. J.).-Held, that an
administrator, who is an attorney, and who prosecutes a suit at law upon
the bond of a former administrator, is entitled to a counsel fee as well
as taxed costs to be included in the assessment of damages upon a judg-
ment recovered on the bond against the derelict administrator and his
surety.
One line of decisions holds that where a proper administration of an
estate requires professional services the executors or administrators may
themselves perform such necessary services as attorneys, and be entitled
to resonable compensation therefor. Teagu - v. Corbitt, 57 Ala. 607. On
the other hand, many courts have adopted tie doctrine that no allowance
can be made to an attorney for professional services rendered an estate
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of which he is administrator. Willard v. Bassett, 27 Ill. 37. A trustee
can make no profit out of his office, for the reason that he shall not be
placed in any position where his interest may be opposed to duty. Hough
v. Harvay, 71 Ill. 72. Nor can he recover for professional services even
when the costs are not payable out of the trust funds. It re Reed, 12
N. Y. St. Rep. 139. When counsel fees are allowed to an administrator
they are not the usual professional charges, but a fair and reasonable
allowance in view of all the facts of the particular case. Clark v. Knox,
70 Ala. 529.
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES-TRANSFERS INVALID---TNsoLvENcv.-TRANS-
FER AS SECURITY.-GoDREY FRANK & CO., ET AL., v. DOUGHTY, 47 So. 643
(Miss.).-Held, that though a grantor was financially embarrassed and
was indebted to others when he executed a deed of trust on land to his
wife, who was also a creditor, the trust deed being for the grantee's sole
benefit to secure a valid debt without any benefit being reserved to the
grantor, was not in fraud of the other creditors.
The general rule is that no debtor can legally make any conveyance
which will place his property beyond the reach of his creditors without their
consent. De Wolf v. Sprague Manufacturirg Co., 49 Conn. 282. How-
ever, a failing or insolvent debtor may select one or more of his creditors
and pay them in full to the exclusion of any others, provided he retains
no benefit himself beyond what the law allows or secures to him. Mc-
Dowell v. Steele, 29 Fed. 738. But should the preferred creditor be the
wife of the debtor, the courts will scrutinize the transaction very closely
and any conveyance under such circumstances must clearly appear to be
made in good faith and for valuable consideration. First Nat. Bank v.
Bartlett, 8 Neb. 319. The burden of proof in such a case rests on the
grantee to show a consideration not materially disproportionate to the
value of the land conveyed. McTeers v. Perkins, io6 Ala. 411. Contra:
Grant v. Ward, 64 Me. 239.
HIGHWAYS-FRIGHTENING HORSES-NEGLIGENCE.-JOHN F. DAVIS &
SON v. THORNBURG, 62 S. W. io88 (N. C.).-Held, that the defendants were
not liable for leaving a broken-down traction engine on the side of the
highway unless they had unreasonably delayed in repairing and removing it.
Most of the courts hold that such objects left within the limits of the
highway, but outside the traveled way, are defects merely from their
tendency to frighten horses, Cooley on Torts, Students' Edition, Sec. 372;
Morse v. Richmond, 41 Vt. 435; but it is immaterial whether the object
is within or without the limits of the highway. House v. Metcalf, 27 Conn.
631. The following objects have been held to constitute such defects: A
load of machinery left by the *oadside, Bennett v. Lovel, 12 R. I. 166; a
white cloth used as a hay cap near the road, Lynn v. Hooper, 93 Me. 46;
and a hollow log, blackened by fire, on the side of the highway, Foshay v.
Glen Haven, 25 Wis. 288. Some courts, however, hold that an object in
the highway is not to be deemed a defect for the sole reason that it is of
a nature to frighten horses, Kingsbury v. Dedham, 95 Mass. i86; but it
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must be calculated to frighten ordinarily gentle and well trained horses.
Poileg v. Simmons, io6 Pa. St. 95. Still other courts hold that it is not
an actionable defect unless the traveler actually comes into contact with
the object. Cook z,. Charlesto-wn, 98 Mass. So; contra: Bartlett s. Hoockett,
48 N. H. I8.
HoMICIDE--DuTY TO RETREAT.-1%IllLER V. STATE, 119 N. W. 85o
(Wis.).-HIeld, that the common law rule as to the duty of one at-
tacked to "retreat to the wall" or so far as he can, or so far that to go
further would rather increase than decrease the danger, is no longer
the law.
The doctrine of "retreat to the wall" had its origin before the
general introduction of fire-arms and to-day seems to be considered obso-
lete or loosely construed in the majority of states. The idea of retreat
is lost in the greater question, did the defendant, when assaulted, believe
or have reason to believe that the use of a deadly weapon was necessary
to his own safety. Runyan V. State, 57 Ind. 8o; Philips v. Commonwealth,
63 Ky. (2 Duv.) 328. Even where the courts are more strict in their
application of this rule, the suddenness of the attack, the peril of ex-
posing the person during flight, of endangering a third party, and the
fact that those in a position of peril are not called upon to weigh with a
nicety the question of what is the proper line of action, is taken into
consideration. People v. Fiori, ioS N. Y. S. 416; People v. Macard, 73
Mich. i5; People z,. Harper, 2 Wheeler Cr. Cas. 347. At variance with
the more general modern tendency is the old common law rule that no one
is excused for taking human life if with safety to his own person he
could have retired from the combat. This more peaceable view is still
held in many jurisdictions. State v. Honey, 65 AdI. 764 (Del.) ; People
v. Mallon, 189 N. Y. 520; State v. Kennedy, 9 N. C. 572.
HOMICIDE-UNLAWFUL ARREST-RIGHT TO RESIST.-PERDUE V. STATE,
63 S. E. 922 (GA.).-Held. that a citizen whom it is attempted unlaw-
fully to arrest has a right to resist force with f6rce proportionate to that
being used to arrest him ; and if, in the exercise of such right of resist-
ance, he kills an officer who is unlawfully attempting to arrest him he
is guilty of no offense. Powell, J., dissenting.
A large number of jurisdictions hold with the above case, that no
crime is committed in the killing of an officer while resisting unlawful
arrest. Simmerman v. State, 14 Nebr. 568; State v. Oliver, 2 Houst.
(Del.) 585; Starr v. U. S., 153 U. S. 614. Other courts ho!d that there
must be danger of bodily harm to the defendant before the killing of a
person attempting to make an illegal arrest becomes justifiable. State v.
Row, 8i Iowa 138; Bowling zi. Commonwaelth, 7 Ky. L. Rep. 821; State ,.
Cantieny, 34 Minn. I. In Williams v. State, 44 Ala. 41, it is held that
it is the duty of a person to submit to the illegal arrest and seek redress
at law. On the other hand the English courts and those in some Amer-
ican jurisdictions hold that when a police officer is slain while attempting
to make an unlawful arrest, the offense is reduced from murder to man-
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slaughter. Reg. z. Lockley, 4 Fost. & F. 155; Re.r. v. Thompson, I
Moody C. C. 8o; State z. Schcele, 57 Conn. 307.
INSURANCE-LIFE INSURANCE-EXECUTION OF INSURED FOR CRIME.-
McCuE v. N. W. MUT. LIFE INS. Co., 167 FED. 435.-Held, that as the laws
of Wisconsin govern in this case the rule laid down by the Wisconsin
courts must be followed and so the fact that the insured was executed
for a crime did not bar a recovery on the policy by his heirs, where it
contained no provision excluding such risk. Waddill, Dist. J., dissenting.
The courts are about evenly divided on this point. Some hold that
the legal execution of the insured for a crime committed by him is no
defense to a suit for his policy in the absence of any provision of the
policy exempting the company from liability in that event. Collins v.
Metro. Ins. Co., 232 Ill. 37. While others hold that where the insured has
been convicted and executed for his crime the beneficiaries cannot recover
on the insurance policy. Burt v. Union Cent. Ins. Co., 187 U. S. 362.
Public policy will not permit a recovery by heirs through wrong of in-
sured. Schreiner z. High Court, 35 Ill. App. 576. But it is stated that
the liability of the insurer is not avoided on the ground of public policy
by the fact, that the insured is executed for a crime. Grcenhood on
Public Policy, pp. I, 2.
MASTER AND SERVANT-IDENTITY OF EMPLOYER-INDEPENDENT CON-'
TRACTOR.-BoWIE V. COFFIN VALVE Co., 86 N. E. 914 (MASS.).-Held, that
unless an employee knew he was working for an independent contractor no
relation of employer and employee existed between the employee and the
contractor, sirce he could not be transferred from one employer to another
without his consent, expressly given or implied.
The general rule in these cases seems to he that he who agrees
to furnish the completed work through servants over whom he retains
control is responsible for their negligence in the conduct of it. Standard
Oil Co. v. Anderson, 81 C. C. A. 399; Higgins v. Western U. T. Co., 156
N. Y. 75. And the mere fact that a contractor's servant is sent to do
work pointed out to him by the owner will not make him a servant of
the owner. Driseoll v. Towle, 181 Mass. 416; neither will the owner's
right to inspect the work, Pack v. N. Y., 4 Seld. 222 (N. Y.) ; nor pay-
ment of wages by the owner; The Harold, 21 Fed. Rep. 428; nor the
fact that the contractor's servants and the master's servants are engaged
in a common employment, Morgan v. Smith, 159 Mass. 57o. But a gen-
eral servant of one person may, for a particular occasion, become the
servant of another, Delaware L. & IV. Ry Co. v. Hardy, 59 N. J. L. 35;
and for the particular employment he is the servant of the other, Hasty
T. Sears, 157 Mass. 123. Though in all cases it seems the servant must
consent to the transfer and accept the other person as his master. Ward
,. New England Fibre Co., 154 Mass. 419.
MASTER AND SERVANT-INJURIES TO THIRD PARTIES-INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTOR-LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER-BLASTING.-KENDALL V. JOHNSON,
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99 P.Ac. 310 (WAsu.).-Held, that blasting rock in the Cascade Mountains,
far removed from any human habitation, falls within the exceptions to the
general rule of an employer's non-liability for injuries resulting from the
doing of work placed in the hands of an independent contractor.
The weight of authority seems to hold that blasting is within the ex-
ceptions to the general rule if the employer used due care in selecting
a competent contractor, Hill v. Schneider, 13 N. Y. App. Div. 299; For-
syth T. Hooper, 93 Mass. 419; and it is his legal duty to select a com-
petent and careful contractor. Brannock v. Elmore, 114 Mo. 55. Fur-
thermore, this rule applies even though the blasting is done in close
proximity to adjoining buildings. French s,. Vix, 143 N. Y. go; contra:
Wetherbee v. Partridge, 175 Mass. 185. But other courts hold that blast-
ing is not within the exceptions. Buddin v. Fortunato, x6 Daly 195
(N. Y.); St. Paul Water Co. v. Ware, 16 Wall. 566 (U. S.). Yet some
jurisdictions hold the principal a joint wrong-doer. Carmen v. Steuben-
vill', etc., Ry. Co., 4 Ohio St. 399.
MONEY PAID--MONEY PAID UNDER ILLEGAL CONTRACT.-McCALL V.
WHALEY, 115 S. W. 658 (TEx.).-Held, that if an illegal contract is ex-
ecutory, money paid thereunder may be recovered.
The law is not satisfactorily settled on this point, but generally money
paid or goods delivered on an illegal executory contract can be recovered.
Love v. Harvey, 114 Mass. 8o; Fisher v. Hildreath, 117 Mass. 558. In
such cases the law implies a promise on the part of the person re-
ceiving the money to refund it in favor of the party paying it. Adams
Express Co. v. Reno, 48 Mo. 268. Because it best comports with public
policy to arrest the illegal proceeding before it is consummated. Stacey v.
Foss, ig Me. 335. The following cases illustrate the rule holding that
a recovery could be had for money paid on shares of stock to be illegally
issued, Fairchild v. Gallatin, 1OO U. S. 47; or for goods sold in further-
ance of an illegal combination, Continental Wall Paper Co. v. L. Vought
and Sons Co., 77 C. C. A. 567; or for a bond or mortgage given to indemnify
bail, Moloney v. Nelson, 158 N. Y. 351; contra: U. S. v. Ryder, 11o U. S.
729. But in Ullman v. St. Louis Fair Ass'n, 167 Mo. 273, a recovery was
denied on goods delivered in performance of an illegal contract; also for
money paid on a note given to renounce an executorship, Ellicott v. Cham-
berlain, 38 N. J. L. 6o4; and on a contract between a councilman and a
municipal corporation. Bay v. Davidson, 133 Ia. 688. It seems, however,
that a recovery will be denied on all contracts involving moral turpitude
or contrary to public policy. Edwards v. Randle, 63 Ark. 318.
NEw TRIAL-MISCONDUCT OF COUNSEL-TREATING JURORS TO CIGARS.-
STEENDURGH V. McRORIE, 113 N. Y. Supp. 1118.-Held, that where one of
the attorneys for the prevailing party twice treated the jurors to cigars
during the progress of the trial and before they had retired to deliberate
on their verdict, a new trial is required.
It has been well established that a new trial will be granted if
jurors are entertained during the trial by the party in whose favor the
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verdict was rendered. Johnson v. Hobard, 45 Fed. 542; Doud v. Guthrie,
13 Ill. App. 653; Pelharn v. Page, 6 Ark. 535; Cottle v. Cottle, 6 Me. 140.
And so it has been ground for a new trial, that the prevailing party
furnished the jury with cigars. Platt v. Threadgill, 8o Fed. i92; People
v. Montague, 71 Mich. 447; Bender v. Buehrer, 8 Ohio C. C. 244. But if
the furnishing of cigars or refreshments was without any improper de-
sign, and did not influence the jury, the verdict will stand. Koester v.
Ottun wa, 34 Iowa 41; Kennedy v. Halliday, 105 Mo. 34. And the ver-
dict will stand where the jury were ignorant that the refreshments were
furnished by a party to the suit. Vane v. City of Evanston, 15o Ill. 616.
And also where prevailing party was ignorant that they were being
charged to him. Tripp v. Bristol Co., 2 Allen (Mass.) 556. And if
during the suspension of a cause refreshments were furnished by both
parties, the verdict will not be set aside. Dennison v. Collins, I Cow.
(N. Y.) III.
TELEGRAPHS AND TELEPHONES-ERRORS-DAMAGES FOR Loss OF CON-
TRACT.WESTERN UNION TEL. CO. V. WEBB & SMITH, 48 SO. 408 (Miss.).-
Held, that a telegraph company is not liable for damages resulting from
an error in a message from a prospective contractor to plaintiffs as to
the time in which he could complete a building, which error caused
plaintiff to award the contract to another firm at a higher bid; there
being no complete contract and plaintiff losing only an opportunity to
make an advantageous contract.
The decisions are not uniform, but the weight of authority is that
damages can be recovered for the loss of a prospective contract. Tel.
Co. v. Tatman, 73 Ga. 285; Bowen v. Tel. Co., 84 Tex. 476; Tel. Co. v.
Nagle, ii Tex. Civ. App. 539. It is perfectly competent to prove what
would have been done if a telegraph message had been promptly trans-
mitted, as a means of fixing the damages against the company for a
failure to deliver. True v. Tel. Co., 6o Me. 9; Tel. Co. v. Hyer, 22 Fla.
637. The cases adopting the doctrine of the case at hand do so on the
ground that though a profitable speculation might and probably would have
been made, yet damages cannot be recovered because they cannot be made
reasonably certain by evidence. Booth v. Rolling Mills, 60 N. Y. 487;
White v. Miller, 71 N. Y. 173. Some courts hold in cases of this kind
that damages are too remote for recovery against a telegraph company.
Tel. Co. v. Watson, 94 Ga. 202.
TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONES-INJURIES FROM CONSTRUCTION AND
MAINTENANCE-CARE REQUIRED.-SOUTHERN TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE
Co. v. EVANS, 1I6 S. W. 418 (TEx.).-Held, that a telephone company
placing and maintaining an instrument in the house of a patron for his
use must exercise the care of a prudent man in selecting such approved
lightning arresters as are reasonably necessary to guard against acci-
dents that might fairly be expected to occur.
The courts are in hopeless conflict on this point. Enis v. Gray, 87
Hun. 355 (N. Y.), holds that ordinary care is required to protect the occu-
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pants of the premises where a telephone is installed. But some courts
hold that reasonable care is required to protect the owner, Witner v.
Buff & N. F. E. L. Co., 98 N. Y. Supp. 781; or the owner's son, Walters v.
Denver Cosol. E. L. Co., 17 Colo. App. 192; or the owner's servant,
Brooks v. Consol. Gas Co., 70 N. J. L. 2II; which means care and watch-
fulness commensurate to the danger, Hayes v. Raleigh Gas Co., 114 N. C.
211. Others hold that a high degree of care must be exercised to pro-
tect the owner of the premises, Gilbert v. Duluth Gen. E. Co., 93 Minn. 99;
or the owner's wife. Alton R. & L Co. v. Foulds, 8I Ill. App. 322. Still
others hold that the highest degree of care must be used in such cases,
Alexander v. Nauticope L. Co., 209 Pa. 571; and that such care is very
expensive or inconvenient is no excuse for failure to exercise it. Mc-
Laughlin v. Louisville E. L. Co., ioo Ky. 173.
